Carl-Gustaf shoulder weapons. RBS 70 air defence. Giraffe radars. A26 submarines chosen over competitors from five nations. And on 12 March 2026, two new agreements covering submarine maintenance, autonomous naval systems, and drone programmes that didn't exist five years ago. The Saab-Poland relationship is the most strategically significant bilateral defence partnership in the Baltic region — and it is accelerating.
The relationship between Saab AB and the Polish Armed Forces did not start with submarines. It started with an 84mm recoilless rifle that a Swedish engineer designed in the late 1940s — and which, in its fourth-generation form, Poland has just ordered in quantities that make it one of the largest single Carl-Gustaf contracts in history. That trajectory — from a shoulder-launched weapon to a submarine programme worth approximately $2.5 billion — traces the arc of a defence industrial partnership that has grown from transactional procurement into something more strategically significant: a formal bilateral alignment between Sweden and Poland, two nations that joined NATO within twelve months of each other, that share a Baltic Sea coastline and a Russian border, and that have concluded that their security interests are best served by integrating their defence industries at the platform level.
The most recent chapter in that story was written on 12 March 2026, when Saab CEO Micael Johansson signed two new collaboration agreements in Warsaw — one with Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), Poland's state armaments holding company, and one with WB Group, Poland's leading private defence technology company. Those agreements, brief in their press release language and dense in their strategic implications, are the subject of this piece. But to understand what they mean, you must understand what came before them.
Before the partnership agreements, before the submarine selection, before the strategic alignment between Stockholm and Warsaw — Saab was already embedded in the Polish Armed Forces through a portfolio of battlefield-proven systems that Polish soldiers train on, carry into exercises, and would deploy in any conflict on NATO's eastern flank.
| System | Contract / Order | Value | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carl-Gustaf M4 | March 2024 · MND procurement authority | SEK 12.9B (~$1.2B) | Anti-armour, anti-structure, multi-role infantry fire support |
| RBS 70 NG | SEK 8B framework 2023 · "Western customer" | Part of SEK 8B package | Short-range air defence · laser-guided · 9km range |
| Giraffe 1X Radar | SEK 8B framework 2023 | Part of SEK 8B package | 360° AESA surveillance · SHORAD C2 integration |
| AT4CS / AT4CS TW | Ongoing Polish Army inventory | Not separately disclosed | Disposable anti-armour · confined space urban warfare |
The Orka programme is one of the most consequential defence procurement decisions in Polish military history. Poland has not operated a credible submarine force in the Baltic Sea since its Soviet-era Kilo-class vessel — commissioned in 1986 — became effectively non-operational. A concept paper first issued in 2012 called for three modern submarines to be delivered by 2030. It took thirteen years, successive governments, and a complete transformation of the European security environment before Poland finally made a decision.
On 26 November 2025, Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz announced at a press conference that Poland had selected Saab's A26 Blekinge-class design for the Orka programme. The decision was described by the Defence Minister as "an extraordinarily important day for Poland's security and for our Navy." Sweden's Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson called it "a historic day for the Swedish-Polish partnership." Saab CEO Micael Johansson said Saab was "honoured to have been selected." Five competing nations — Germany (ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems with the Type 212CD), France (Naval Group with the Scorpène), Italy (Fincantieri), Spain (Navantia), and South Korea (Hanwha Ocean with the KSS-III Batch II) — were passed over.
Designed specifically for Baltic Sea operations. The A26 is 65 metres long with a surfaced displacement of approximately 2,000 tonnes — sized and optimised for the shallow, acoustically complex waters of the Baltic. This matters enormously: the Baltic Sea is relatively shallow, with complex bottom topography and thermocline layers that affect sonar performance and submarine concealment. A submarine designed for open-ocean deep water operations — like some competing designs — is sub-optimal in this environment. The A26 was designed from the beginning for exactly the operational theatre Poland needs.
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) — 18+ days submerged. The A26 uses a Stirling-cycle AIP system burning liquid oxygen and diesel fuel, allowing the submarine to operate submerged without using its conventional diesel engines — which require air intake — for more than 18 days. This is critical for Baltic covert operations: a submarine that cannot be detected via snorkel emissions or propulsion noise is one that can conduct long-duration surveillance, mining, and special forces insertion missions without surfacing in a contested environment.
Multi-Mission Portal — the unique architecture. A distinctive feature of the A26 design is its oversized bow-mounted Multi-Mission Portal — effectively an enlarged torpedo tube that provides access to a flexible payload lock. This allows the A26 to accommodate oversized payloads: special forces swimmers and their equipment, large unmanned underwater vehicles, advanced mine-laying systems, or future autonomous payload concepts. No competing design offered this degree of mission flexibility.
The gap-filler commitment. Under the agreement, the Royal Swedish Navy will loan Poland a Södermanland-class A17 submarine — one of Sweden's existing fleet — while the A26 boats are under construction, expected for delivery from approximately 2030. This allows Polish Naval personnel to begin training on a Swedish diesel-electric submarine before their own vessels arrive. It is an extraordinary commitment by a NATO ally, reflecting how seriously Sweden treats the Baltic security architecture that Polish submarines will reinforce.
The 12 March 2026 agreements are the third layer of a partnership structure that has been building systematically since September 2025. The first layer was the initial collaboration agreements signed at MSPO Kielce — Poland's International Defence Industry Exhibition — in September 2025, establishing the frameworks with both PGZ and WB Group. The 12 March 2026 agreements represent, in Saab's own words, "a further progression from these initial partnerships" — meaning specific technical work areas have now been identified and committed to, moving beyond statement of intent toward actionable industrial cooperation.
The PGZ agreement addresses one of the most underappreciated dimensions of the Orka programme: in-country submarine maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capability within Poland. This is not a trivial technical point. A submarine that must return to Sweden for every major maintenance cycle is not a sovereign capability — it is an expensive dependency. Poland's stated ambition, consistent with its broader industrial offset doctrine, is to develop the domestic infrastructure to maintain its own submarines on Polish soil, with Polish personnel and Polish industrial partners.
PGZ's role in this is natural: the group already operates Poland's shipbuilding and naval industrial base through subsidiaries including the Gdynia and Szczecin shipyards, and has experience maintaining Poland's existing naval vessels. The Saab-PGZ MRO agreement creates the framework for transferring submarine maintenance technology and know-how to the Polish industrial base — a process that takes years to develop and that begins now, well before the first A26 enters service, specifically so that the capability is ready when the submarines arrive. Saab CEO Johansson framed it explicitly as "sharing expertise and scaling up innovation together" — corporate language for a technology transfer that goes well beyond a supply contract.
The WB Group agreement is the more technically novel of the two — and the one that reveals where both companies believe the future of Baltic warfare is heading. WB Group is not a traditional defence manufacturer. It is Poland's most innovative private defence technology company, the creator of the FlyEye reconnaissance drone widely used in Ukraine, the Warmate loitering munition, and most recently the GLADIUS reconnaissance-strike unmanned system — a battery-level autonomous fire unit described by WB Group as "highly advanced and unique in Europe."
The agreement covers two specific programme areas: autonomous naval systems and unmanned aerial systems Gladius and Future Task Force. The autonomous naval systems component connects directly to the Orka capability framework — submarines operating in the Baltic increasingly need to work alongside unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that can extend their sensor reach, conduct minelaying or mine countermeasures independently, and provide above-water surveillance without requiring the submarine to surface. Saab's naval systems division has developed concepts in this space; WB Group brings autonomous systems integration expertise from years of UAS development in a live combat environment.
The Gladius connection is equally significant. GLADIUS is WB Group's most advanced system — a battery-level reconnaissance-strike complex integrating unmanned reconnaissance, target designation, and loitering munition engagement in a single command framework. Poland has just contracted for 12 battery-level GLADIUS fire units under EU SAFE funding. Saab's involvement in its further development — through this agreement — suggests that the next generation of GLADIUS may incorporate Swedish sensor, radar, or communications technology, and potentially that GLADIUS concepts may be offered to other NATO markets through a Saab-WB Group commercial partnership.
The depth of the Saab-Poland relationship is not accidental and it is not primarily commercial. It is the product of two nations that joined NATO within twelve months of each other — Sweden in March 2024, Finland in April 2023 — and that have concluded that their security is structurally linked in ways that pre-date their formal NATO membership.
Sweden and Poland share a Baltic Sea coastline. Both nations' security planners have concluded that the Baltic is a potential theatre of operations in any conflict with Russia — and that the Baltic's security depends on both nations having submarine capability, air defence capability, and the ability to operate joint naval and autonomous systems in a contested maritime environment. Poland brings land mass, the largest conventional army in NATO, and the industrial base to produce ammunition, vehicles, and electronics. Sweden brings submarine design, precision weapon expertise (Carl-Gustaf, RBS 70, AT4), and a defence industrial tradition built on the premise that a small country must produce technologically superior equipment to offset adversary mass.
The September 2025 MOU with PGZ was explicitly aimed at "exploring cooperation on defence solutions for multi-domain operations and evaluating potential joint initiatives in support of Ukraine and European security." That is not procurement language — it is strategic alignment language. Both nations are actively supporting Ukraine. Both are building their own defence industrial capacity for Baltic contingencies. And both have concluded that integrating their industrial bases through Saab-PGZ-WB Group structures creates a combined capability that strengthens both countries more than separate procurement would.
Saab AB (SAAB-B.ST) is listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and is a direct investable vehicle for the Polish defence procurement programme at the platform level. The Carl-Gustaf contract alone — SEK 12.9 billion — is material against Saab's annual revenue. The Orka submarine programme, if finalised at approximately PLN 10 billion (~$2.5 billion), would be one of the largest single export orders in Saab's history. The combination of these two programmes, plus the RBS 70 NG and Giraffe contracts, makes Poland one of Saab's most significant single-country export markets. The WB Group autonomous systems collaboration, if it leads to co-developed products sold to other NATO customers, extends that relationship beyond bilateral procurement into joint product development with global addressable markets.
For investors in Polish equities, the implications flow through PGZ (unlisted but accessible through bonds as we have covered) and WB Group (private). The industrial offset component of the A26 programme — Saab has committed to technology transfer and Polish industrial participation — will flow through Polish shipyards and engineering companies. The Asseco defence software angle we documented separately is also directly relevant: every submarine requires command and control software, logistics systems, and training platforms, and Asseco is Poland's primary defence software contractor.
The 12 March 2026 Saab-PGZ and Saab-WB Group agreements are not press release events. They are the latest iteration of a bilateral defence industrial integration that began with shoulder weapons and is now encompassing submarines, autonomous naval systems, and a drone programme that has been combat-validated in the most demanding operational environment on earth. The Orka programme selection in November 2025 was the headline. The submarine MRO capability agreement and the WB Group autonomous systems collaboration are the infrastructure that makes the headline sustainable — because a submarine programme without domestic maintenance capability and without autonomous systems integration is a procurement, not a partnership.
The trajectory of this relationship — from Carl-Gustaf to Giraffe to RBS 70 to A26 to autonomous naval systems to joint future warfare concepts — is the trajectory of two nations that understand they will defend the same sea in the same conflict. The industrial integration that Saab, PGZ, and WB Group are building is the commercial expression of that geopolitical reality. For investors tracking the Polish defence thesis, Saab is not a competitor to the domestic Polish industrial base — it is the Swedish partner that enables it to operate at a level of sophistication that purely domestic development could not reach on the same timeline.
This blog post is produced by Fides Polonia Capital Management for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities. Saab AB is listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SAAB-B.ST) and is a publicly traded security. PGZ and WB Group are not publicly listed. Carl-Gustaf contract value confirmed by Saab press release (March 2024) and Defense News. SEK 8 billion framework order referenced in Saab press release (February 2023) and identified as Poland by multiple defence publications. A26 selection data from Breaking Defense, The War Zone, Naval News, Euro-SD, and official Polish MND statements (November 2025). Agreement details from Saab official press release (12 March 2026) and Defence Industry EU. WB Group GLADIUS contract details from Defence Industry EU (May/June 2026). Fides Polonia Capital Management may hold positions in securities referenced in this report.