In the spring of 2022, a small missile made in a factory in central Poland started shooting down the most advanced Russian attack helicopters in history. NATO militaries from Oslo to Washington took notice immediately. The factory behind it has been running at seven times its pre-war output for three years. Nobody in the Western business press has written the story.
In the spring of 1986, a CIA-supplied American FIM-92 Stinger missile was fired by an Afghan mujahideen fighter at a Soviet Mil Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship. It hit. The helicopter went down. Within months, every Soviet pilot in Afghanistan knew the sky was no longer safe below 15,000 feet, and the battlefield calculus of a nine-year war changed permanently. The Stinger became the most famous shoulder-launched missile in history — not because of its technical specifications, but because its combat results were documented, distributed, and impossible to deny. Reagan sent Congress a photograph. Hollywood made a film. Lockheed Martin never needed a sales brochure again.
On 11 May 2022, a fighter of Ukraine's 95th Air Assault Brigade — Yuri Kochevenko — posted a video on Twitter. It showed a Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter — the most advanced rotary-wing combat aircraft in Russia's inventory, worth approximately $16 million, designed with redundant systems specifically to survive missile hits — falling out of the sky in the Izium area. The weapon that brought it down was a Polish Piorun MANPADS. Made in Skarżysko-Kamienna. Assembled by hand. Price per missile: approximately €172,000.
That video was seen by every NATO defence procurement officer, every air force commander, and every military analyst trying to understand what was actually working in Ukraine's air defence. And what they saw — a shoulder-carried Polish missile defeating a Ka-52 that had survived previous engagements — generated a buyer queue that has not stopped growing in four years. The factory that built that missile has increased its output sevenfold. Its parent company's net profit grew from PLN 59 million in 2023 to PLN 235 million in 2024 — a nearly fourfold increase in a single year. Ten countries now operate the Piorun. The Western business press has not noticed.
Headquarters: Skarżysko-Kamienna, Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship, central Poland. Founded: 1922, operating from 25 August 1924 as the Państwowa Fabryka Amunicji — the State Ammunition Factory. Ownership: Wholly owned subsidiary of Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), Poland's state defence holding company. CEO: Renata Gruszczyńska (as of 2024). Primary products: Piorun MANPADS, Grom MANPADS, SPIKE-LR anti-tank guided missiles, PIRAT lightweight anti-tank missile, 155mm artillery ammunition, 12.7mm small-calibre ammunition, 70mm rockets, warheads, propellants, and aviation bomb fuzes.
Mesko is not simply an ammunition company. It is the hub of Poland's precision-guided munitions industry — the facility where propellant chemistry, seeker electronics, and final missile assembly converge in a single vertically integrated production process. The Piorun programme involves a consortium: Mesko leads final assembly and energetics, CRW Telesystem-Mesko develops the guidance system and cooled infrared seeker suite, and the Military Institute of Armament Technology (WITU) provides the technical oversight and qualification testing. This three-party consortium has been working together since the Piorun development programme was launched in 2010.
The factory in Skarżysko-Kamienna opened a brand new small-calibre ammunition production hall in June 2025 that increased its output from 50 million to 250 million rounds per year — a fivefold capacity increase for 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and 12.7mm ammunition. This expansion, combined with the Piorun ramp, and additional real estate purchased near Kraśnik in late 2024 specifically for MANPADS production expansion, makes Mesko one of the fastest-growing defence manufacturers in the NATO alliance.
Skarżysko-Kamienna is not a city most people outside Poland know. It has approximately 43,000 inhabitants, sits in the Świętokrzyskie hills of central Poland, and built its identity entirely around the weapons factory that the interwar Polish state established there in the 1920s. Like Nowa Dęba — home to Dezamet — and Mielec — home to PZL Mielec — Skarżysko-Kamienna is one of Poland's purpose-built industrial towns where the factory and the community are functionally inseparable. Mesko has been the town's largest employer for a century. When the Piorun order book expanded sevenfold, the local economy expanded with it.
Piorun — the Polish word for thunderbolt — is a man-portable air-defence system. A single soldier carries it, shoulders it, acquires a target through the optical sight, fires, and the missile homes autonomously to the target using its infrared seeker. The entire engagement from acquisition to firing takes seconds. The launcher weighs approximately 16 kilograms complete — heavy, but manageable for a trained infantryman. And unlike the crew-served air defence systems that require vehicles, generators, radar arrays, and teams of specialists, a Piorun can be operated by a single soldier with hours of training, deployed anywhere a person can stand, fired from a rooftop, a treeline, a riverbank, or the back of a truck.
The Piorun's lineage is as Polish as the factory that makes it — which is to say, it also carries a Soviet inheritance that was systematically and deliberately removed over four decades of indigenous engineering. Poland operated the Soviet 9K32 Strela-2 MANPADS in the Warsaw Pact era. In 1995, Mesko introduced the Grom — meaning thunder — which was built on the Igla-1 airframe but with domestically produced components replacing the Soviet imports. Grom was the first genuinely Polish-content MANPADS, even though its origins were Soviet-lineage. It worked, and Poland exported it to Georgia and others.
In 2010, a consortium of Mesko, CRW Telesystem-Mesko, and the Military University of Technology launched the development programme for an entirely new generation — the Piorun. The goal was explicit: replace the Grom's uncooled infrared seeker with a cryogenically cooled seeker of dramatically higher sensitivity, extend the engagement range, improve resistance to infrared countermeasures and flares, add a non-contact proximity fuze to improve kill probability against crossing targets, and adapt the entire system for night operations. The development was finalised in 2015. The system was publicly unveiled at the MSPO defence exhibition in Kielce in 2016. Production contracts were signed, and the Polish Armed Forces began receiving Piorun systems from 2019.
The cooled seeker is the most important single technical advance over the Grom. Uncooled IR seekers detect heat signatures at limited range and can be confused by flares and engine exhaust plumes at angles outside the direct exhaust cone. A cryogenically cooled seeker — operating at temperatures near absolute zero — is sensitive enough to detect the aerodynamic heating of an aircraft's airframe in flight, independent of engine exhaust. This means it can engage targets from any angle — head-on, side-aspect, or tail-chase — rather than requiring the operator to manoeuvre for a tail-chase position. In a real battlefield engagement, the ability to fire from any direction is the difference between a successful intercept and watching a target escape.
Poland delivered its first Piorun systems to Ukraine between February and March 2022 — within days of Russia's full-scale invasion. They were used in combat almost immediately. The results were, in the dry language of defence procurement, remarkable.
The following aircraft types have been confirmed or credibly attributed to Piorun engagements in Ukraine, drawn from Ukrainian military statements, brigade-level battlefield reports, and Western defence journalism cross-referencing visual evidence:
Mil Mi-24 Hind — Russia's primary attack helicopter from the Soviet era and a veteran of Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Syria. The same platform that Stingers targeted in 1986. Multiple confirmed Piorun kills. The Mi-24 uses both active (flares) and passive (exhaust suppressors) countermeasures — neither stopped the Piorun's cooled seeker in documented engagements.
Mil Mi-28 Havoc — Russia's dedicated tank-hunting attack helicopter, designed with redundant systems and armoured protection specifically to survive MANPADS hits. Documented Piorun kill in Luhansk Oblast, 1 April 2022, captured on video: missile struck the exhaust area, tail boom separated, aircraft destroyed. Both crew members reported to have survived, but the aircraft did not.
Kamov Ka-52 Alligator — Russia's most advanced attack helicopter, featuring a coaxial rotor design, advanced electronic warfare suite, and the Vitebsk infrared countermeasures system specifically designed to defeat MANPADS. The Ka-52 was considered by Russian planners to be highly resistant to shoulder-launched missiles. At least two confirmed Piorun kills of Ka-52 aircraft were attributed to the 95th Air Assault Brigade, the most notable on 11 May 2022 near Izium. The video evidence was unambiguous.
Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot — Russia's primary ground attack jet, flying at low altitude in direct support of ground forces. Fixed-wing aircraft present a shorter engagement window than helicopters, but the Piorun's high velocity and all-aspect seeker gave operators sufficient time to engage. Multiple Su-25 kills attributed to Piorun.
Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback — Russia's primary supersonic strike aircraft, designed for medium and high altitude operations but occasionally operating at lower altitudes in the first months of the war. At least one Su-34 kill has been attributed to Piorun systems — an extraordinary achievement for a shoulder-launched MANPADS against a supersonic strike aircraft.
Orlan-10 UAVs — Russia's primary tactical reconnaissance drone. Multiple Piorun engagements against Orlan-10s confirmed, demonstrating the system's effectiveness against the full drone threat spectrum that has defined modern warfare in Ukraine.
The aggregate effect of Piorun and other MANPADS on Russian air operations in Ukraine cannot be overstated. In the first weeks of the war, Russia attempted to use its air force in direct tactical support roles — low-altitude helicopter attacks, ground attack jet missions, the kind of operations that had proven decisive in Syria and Chechnya. The MANPADS threat — Piorun and Stinger together — effectively ended that phase of the air campaign. Russian pilots moved to high-altitude ballistic launches, lobbing rockets at targets from outside MANPADS range rather than making precise low-altitude attack runs. This tactical retreat was directly forced by the shoulder-launched missile threat, and Piorun was the most capable European contributor to that result.
Before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Mesko produced approximately 300 Piorun missiles per year — a modest production rate for a system that had only recently entered service and had a single confirmed customer: the Polish Armed Forces. The original contract signed in 2016 envisaged delivery of 420 launcher units and 1,300 missiles by 2022. That was the pre-war planning assumption.
The production expansion has been systematic and technically impressive. Missile parts are manufactured on computer-controlled machines; final assembly is done manually by trained technicians — a production model that allows output to scale through workforce expansion and additional lines without the multi-year lead time that full automation would require. New rocket engine production lines were added. Electronics production was expanded. Supplier capacities were upgraded and cycle times reduced. The Skarżysko-Kamienna facility added new production halls. Additional real estate was purchased near Kraśnik in late 2024 to host further expansion. The 1,000th Piorun took over five years to deliver from the first; the next 2,000 were delivered in under two and a half years. The compounding effect of a sevenfold production increase on revenue and profitability is visible in Mesko's financial results in a way that requires no sophisticated analysis to understand.
The comparison with NATO's other MANPADS manufacturers is striking. Piorun annual production at 2,600+ missiles now exceeds the combined output of the U.S. Stinger (approximately 720 missiles per year) and France's Mistral (approximately 480 missiles per year). That comparison, highlighted by Army Recognition in October 2025, repositioned Poland's Mesko from a regional supplier to the NATO alliance's primary MANPADS production capability — a role nobody in Warsaw's defence industrial planning would have predicted in 2019.
| Customer | Contract / Status | Value | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🇺🇸 United States | Signed 2021 · follow-on expected | Undisclosed | Pre-war order — US procured Piorun even before Ukraine combat proof. Follow-on contract in works as of 2025. |
| 🇺🇦 Ukraine | Active from Feb 2022 · ongoing deliveries | Undisclosed | First combat user · directly responsible for Piorun's global reputation. Ongoing frontline operator. |
| 🇳🇴 Norway | Signed 2022 · fielded in Finnmark | ~$35.6M | Several hundred missiles and launchers. Deployed to Norway's northernmost units facing Russia directly. |
| 🇪🇪 Estonia | Framework signed Autumn 2022 · deliveries from early 2024 | €103M (~$113M) | 100 launchers · 300 missiles. "One of the most successful systems in the Ukrainian war" per Estonian ECDI. |
| 🇱🇻 Latvia | Order placed · active | Undisclosed | Baltic flank procurement driven directly by Ukraine combat results and Russian threat proximity. |
| 🇱🇹 Lithuania | Active · joint procurement explored | Undisclosed | Signed letter of intent as part of Polish-Lithuanian bilateral framework. Joint procurement discussions ongoing. |
| 🇲🇩 Moldova | Active operator | Undisclosed | Air defence recapitalisation amid Russian threat on Transnistrian border. |
| 🇬🇪 Georgia | Linked to orders · active | Undisclosed | Part of Georgia's air defence recapitalisation following its own experience with Russian air power in 2008. |
| 🇸🇪 Sweden | DSEI 2024 · Swedish Defence Procurement Agency | ~SEK 3B (~$290M) | Major order signed at DSEI London. Deliveries expected mid-decade. Sweden's first Piorun acquisition. |
| 🇧🇪 Belgium | Letter of intent May 2025 · 200–300 systems | Undisclosed | Signed in Skarżysko-Kamienna by Polish Defence Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz. Western NATO member validation. |
| 🇫🇷 France / 🇸🇰 Slovakia | Interest expressed · evaluation ongoing | — | France evaluating Piorun as potential procurement. Slovakia also expressed interest. |
The comparison is instructive but requires one important qualification: the Stinger has a 45-year operational history and 30+ operator countries built over decades. The Piorun cannot match that institutional depth. What it can match — and in several categories exceed — is the technical specification of the systems buyers are actually evaluating today, at a lower unit cost, with shorter delivery timelines, from a factory that is currently running at seven times its pre-war output and actively expanding. The EU EDIRPA funding programme's selection of the French Mistral over Piorun for co-financing was described internally as a political decision reflecting French industrial lobbying rather than a technical assessment — a characterisation that the subsequent Belgian, Swedish, and American procurement choices effectively confirmed.
Mesko reported a net profit of PLN 235 million in 2024 — up from PLN 59 million in 2023 and PLN 49 million in Q1 2024 alone. Revenue has not been separately disclosed at Mesko's entity level, but the combination of the Piorun export contracts (Norway $35.6M, Estonia €103M, Sweden SEK 3B, US quantities undisclosed), the domestic Polish Armed Forces contracts, the small-calibre ammunition programme, and the 155mm shell work inherited from the broader PGZ expansion collectively suggest a revenue base in the hundreds of millions of złotych — growing at a rate that would make it one of the fastest-growing defence manufacturers in Europe on a percentage basis.
The trajectory of Mesko's profitability tracks almost perfectly with the Piorun order book. Pre-2022: modest defence contractor profits from domestic orders. 2022: emergency production ramp begins, emergency contracts signed. 2023: PLN 59 million net profit — growth visible but provision-heavy year as capacity investments are made. 2024: PLN 235 million net profit — the investments are yielding revenue and margins simultaneously. The pattern is identical to the playbook of every successful defence company that has scaled production during a wartime demand surge: invest ahead of demand, scale to meet it, earn the margins once volume reaches the new rate.
The Piorun story has almost every element of a great business narrative: a small, overlooked company in an obscure location, making a product that nobody outside specialist circles knew about, whose product was thrust into the most visible combat environment in Europe since 1945 and performed beyond expectation, generating a global buyer queue that the factory could barely fill. The only element missing is a stock ticker that readers can buy.
The Stinger analogy is not hyperbole. After Afghanistan, Stinger production scaled. Raytheon benefited for two decades. The MANPADS category was validated in a way that no peacetime demonstration could achieve. Today, Ukraine has done for Piorun what Afghanistan did for Stinger — except the combat environment in Ukraine is more modern, more extensively documented, and involves more sophisticated targets than the Soviet helicopters that Stinger faced in 1986. Ka-52s with active electronic countermeasures systems. Su-34 supersonic strike aircraft. Modern tactical drones. The Piorun defeated them. The videos exist. The buyers arrived.
A factory in Skarżysko-Kamienna has been producing Poland's most important export product for 100 years. For most of that century, nobody outside defence circles knew it existed. In the spring of 2022, its missile — built by hand at a rate of six per day — began shooting down the most advanced Russian attack helicopters in history on camera, in front of the world's military press. Ten countries are now buying it. Production has increased sevenfold. Net profit has quadrupled year-on-year. Sweden just paid the equivalent of $290 million for a tranche. Belgium signed a letter of intent in the factory itself. The United States was buying it before the war started.
The story of Mesko and Piorun is the story of what happens when a century-old state arms factory — kept alive through communist-era production, post-Cold War budget cuts, and the lean years of Polish defence spending — finds itself precisely positioned for the moment the world changes. The Piorun was the right weapon, at the right time, made by the right people, in the right place. And the 100-year-old factory in central Poland that nobody wrote about is now producing more MANPADS missiles annually than the United States and France combined. That is the story. It deserved to be told.
This blog post is produced by Fides Polonia Capital Management for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice or a solicitation to buy or sell securities. Mesko S.A. and PGZ are not publicly listed companies. PGZ bonds, if listed on the Catalyst market, constitute fixed income securities. All financial data sourced from: Mesko.com.pl official press releases, Defence24 (Poland), Notes From Poland, Army Recognition, The Defense News, Breaking Defense (Estonia ECDI), Bulgarian Military, Pravda Latvia, and Overt Defense. Export contract values from official government and company announcements. Combat record from The Aviationist, Defence24, Overt Defense, and Espreso.tv. Production data from Mesko.com.pl and Defence24 cross-referenced against Polish military analyst Jarosław Wolski factory visit report (May 2026). Comparison data from Army Recognition, MBDA, and Raytheon product specifications. Financial results (net profit PLN 235M 2024) from Notes From Poland citing Mesko official announcement. Fides Polonia Capital Management may hold positions in PGZ bonds or related securities referenced in this report.